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preface
Pattern recognition methods have become a common tool for analysis of Earth Observation
multispectral image data. With the coming of the new, more complex sensors of the EOS
system, it will be important to develop new enhancements to these tools in order that the
full information-yielding capabilities of these new data be realized.
It is common in the theoretical derivation of a pattern recognition algorithm to assume
precise knowledge of the parameters of the data. However, it is usually the case in the
application of pattern recognition methods in practice that such precise knowledge is not
available. For example, in order to obtain optimal performance from a Bayesian classifier,
the a priori probabilities, the multivariate distributions, and appropriate loss functions for
each class are needed; rarely is this information available in precise form. The question thus
arises as to how best to model such imprecise knowledge and to modify the analysis
scheme so that algorithms perform optimally under these more realistic circumstances. This
question is what motivated this work.
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Abstracfl
Two essential elements needed in the process of inference and decision-making are prior
probabilities and likelihood functions. When both of these components are known
accurately and precisely, the Bayesian approach provides a consistent and coherent solution
to the problems of inference and decision-making.
In many situations, however, either one or both of the above components may not be
known, or at least may not be known precisely. This problem of partial knowledge about
prior probabilities and likelihood functions is addressed. There are at least two ways to
cope with this lack of precise knowledge: 1)robust methods, and 2): interval-valued
methods.
First, ways of modeling imprecision and indeterminacies in prior probabilities and
likelihood functions are examined; then how imprecision in the above components carries
over to the posterior probabilities is examined. Finally, the problem of decision making
with imprecise posterior probabilities and the consequences of such actions are addressed.
Application areas where the above problems may occur are in statistical pattern recognition
problems, for example, the problem of classification of high-dimensional multispectral
remote sensing image data.
1 Work reported here was supported in part by NSF Grant ECS 8507405 and NASA Grant NAGW-925
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1.1 Introduction
Inference is the process of observing a sample or samples and drawing information about
certain parameters of the underlying process. There are two distinct categories to inference
problems: some utilize prior information and others are based solely on the observation
samples. It is taken as given that prior information should be used whenever available. To
this extent the Bayesian approach provides a sound and coherent way of combining prior
information, represented by prior probabilities and model information, represented by
likelihood functions.
To put these matters in concrete terms, let us define O = {01, 02, .... 0M} as the set of
parameters or the state of nature; n(0j) as the prior probability on O; and {p(xl0i); 0i e O}
as the set of models or likelihood functions. Then after observing x, the inferential
statement about oi is provided by the posterior probability p(xl0 i) defined by the Bayes'
formula
p(xlO i) 7[(0 i)
n(°ilx) = M (1.1)
E p(xloj) n(oj)
j=l
Decision-making problems are specific forms of inference problems. In decision making
problems two other elements are added; namely a set of actions or decisions D =
{151..... _n} and a loss function L(0i,_Sj(x)). In many problems, the set of decisions and the
set of parameters coincide. Then the problem of decision making is one of choosing an
action from the set of actions or decisions D, in such a way that the expected risk or the
maximum risk is minimized.
1.2 Motivation for this research
As mentioned earlier, when all the components in the process of inference or decision
making, namely the likelihood functions and the prior probabilities, are known the
Bayesianapproachprovides a consistentand coherentsolution. In many real world
problems,however,theabovecomponentsmaynotreally beknown,or at leastmaynot be
knowncompletelyandprecisely.For instance,in theearly stagesof outbreakof anynew
disease,with a smallsamplesize,it is difficult if not impossibleto obtainaprecisemodel
for thediseaseepistemology.Anotherexampleis thecaseof high sampledimensionality,
whererarelyif evertheavailabledatais adequatetoleadto aprecisemodel.
Thedifficulty in specifyingaccurateprior probabilitiesis alsoverycommon.Actually the
prior probabilitiesareoftenassignedquitesubjectively.Thedifficulty in assigningaccurate
prior probabilitiesis themainreasonnon-BayesianpartisansattacktheBayesianapproach.
One can, however, go to the other extremeof doing away altogetherwith the prior
probabilities.It seemself-evidenthatoneshoulduseall the informationavailablewithout
beingeitherunder-or over-committing.
1.3 Statement of the problem
The three interrelated problems to be addressed are: 1) how to describe imprecise prior
probabilities and likelihood functions, 2) how to proceed from imprecise priors and
likelihood functions to imprecise posterior probabilities, and 3) how to make decisions with
imprecise posterior probabilities.
1.4 Useful concepts and terminologies
1.4.1 General remarks
It is important at this point to draw the differences between various sources of uncertainties;
namely, randomness, vagueness, indeterminacies, etc. In this work, the main concern is
with imprecisions resulting from one's inability to specify accurate priors and conditional
densities. Therefore, imprecisions due to "indeterminacies" are the main concern.
An extreme case of indeterminacies is called "total ignorance". Conventional approaches for
handling total ignorance (especially concerning prior probabilities) is to assign probabilities
based on uniform distribution; i.e., if the state of nature is O = {01, 02,..., 0M} and there
is no prior information about the parameters, one may be inclined to assign,
2
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x(Oi) = r-7., i=1.....M.
Thereareatleasttwo criticismsto thismethodof assigningprobabilities:
(1.2)
1) In the case of "total ignorance", intuitively, probabilities should be assigned as
x(Oi) = [0,1], i=l ..... M.
2) When the state of nature 0 is continuous (e.g., 0 = _, this approach gives
improper probabilities; i.e.,
f dn(o) = oo (1.3)
o
It is shown by Berger [3], that decisions based on improper distributions may give rise to
inconsistencies (for definition, see below).
1.4.2 Terminology and Notation
The unknown quantity 0 which affects the decision process is called the state of nature or
the parameter. Prior probabilities for 0i are denoted x(0i). The set of possible outcomes is
the sample space and will be denoted X. (Usually, Xwill be a subset of _). The outcome
of the experiment (i.e., the observation) will be denoted X. Often X will be a vector. The
term "conditional densities", or "model", or "likelihood functions" is used to refer to the
same quantity; i.e., {p(xl0i); 0i e O} or sometimes written as {P0i(x); 0i e O}. E0x[f(x)]
will denote the expectation (over X) of a function g(x), for a given value of 0. L(0i, 8(x))
will represent the losses incurred when upon observing sample x, decision _;(x) is made
and the true state of nature is 0i.
The risk of a decision rule 8(x) is defined as
8)=ExfL(o, = e/L¢o,8(x))dr,(xlo).R( O,
X
(1.4)
This is the expected loss, for each 0, if 8(x) is used repeatedly with varying x in the
problem.
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In orderto decideaboutwhattypeof decisionrule shouldbeused,somesort of ordering
of decision rules is needed. The following definitions (Berger [3]) serve as guide lines.
DEFINITION 1.1: A decision rule 81 is R-better that a decision rule 82 if,
R( 0, 81) _ R( 0, 52) V 0_ O. (1.6)
DEFINITION 1.2: A decision rule is admissible if there exists no R-better
decision rule. A decision rule is inadmissible if there exists an R-better decision
rule.
DEFINITION
distribution n on O, is defined as
r(n,8) = En[ R(o, 8)] = f R(o, 8) n(o) do.
ill
o
Two frequently used decision-making principles are:
1.3: The Bayes risk of a decision rule 5, with respect to a prior
(1.7)
1) The Bayes Risk principle stated as
A decision rule 51is preferred to a rule 52 if,
r(n, 81) < r(n, 82). (1.8)
A decision rule that minimizes r(n,5) is optimal and is called a Bayes rule.
2) The minimax principle stated as
A decision rule 51 is preferred to a decision rule 52 if,
sup R(0, 51) < sup R(0, 52). (1.9)
0 0
A decision rule is a minimax decision rule if it minimizes sup R(0,5) among all the rules in
0
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DEFINITION 1.4: coherency and coherent inference
The concept of coherency can be best explained in terms of betting, so let us define betting
first.
DEFINITION 1.5 : A bet [46] concerning an event E is an arrangement
whereby a sum of tx13 is exchanged for a sum of ct if E occurs or 0 if it does
not. The bet is said to be on or against E according 0_> 0 or o_ < 0. 13is called
the betting rate and tx the stake. Let e be the indicator of the event E and 1 the
indicator of the sure event _. Then a bet concerning E is a random quantity of
the form o_(e - 131).
Let (f_, A) be a measurable space with events Ei e & i =l,2,...,n. And let a real-valued set
function P(Ei) represent the betting rate. Then De Finetti [7] shows that only when P(Ei) is
a probability, i.e. satisfies the axioms of probability, can one avoid the "sure loss" case.
Only when P is a probability function, would it not be possible to select El, E2 ..... En and
the stakes tXl, 0_2 ..... (x n so that a combination of bets relative to these events, at the rates
n
P(Ei) for event Ei, i.e., _ (txi(ei- P(Ei)I)), will assure a positive gain. (of course, it
i=l
would be the same thing to require that no such quantity should be uniformly negative).
Decisions and inference based on coherent real-valued set functions, P, are called coherent
decisions and inferences (Regazzini [33]).

VARIOUS APPROACHES FOR HANDLING IMPRECISION
2.1 Introduction
The Bayesian approach offers an elegant way of combining prior information (i.e., prior
probability _ over O) and model information (i.e., { p(xl 0) ; e e O }), to construct a
distribution p over O x X; where p is the unique probability distribution over O x X that
has _ as its marginal for e and the p(xl 0) as its conditionals given 0. After observing x, the
Bayesian conditions p on x to obtain posterior probabilities for 0. Decisions based on the
Bayes decision rule can be shown to be coherent.
The major criticisms to the Bayesian approach, however, are its requirements for precise
knowledge of probability values and the subjectiveness of prior probabilities. The issue of
prior probabilities being subjective is a philosophical one which will not be addressed here.
One approach to make prior probabilities more objective (frequentist) is to obtain prior
probabilities from n experts and use the weighted average of those.
In an attempt to relax the requirement for precise probability values, several methods have
been proposed in the literature.
2.2 Minimum cross-entropy method
Many people [8,14,19,31,34,35,39-41,47] have tried to quantify available prior
information and data without being over committing. One possible approach is the
minimum cross-entropy method. Here, the prior information about an underlying
distribution, p, and the available information I, which is usually in the form of constraints
on the moments, is combined via operator o to obtain the posterior probability q; that is [39]
q=poI (2.1)
Specifically, let q* be the unknown underlying probability density function and the
available information, I, be given as
6
f gk(X) q*(x) dx = C k
(2.2)
where gk(') are some known functions and Ck are known constants. Further, let the cross-
entropy (also known as discrimination information, directed divergence, or I - divergence)
between two probability density functions q and p be defined as
H[q,p] = f q(x) log[ q(x)/p(x) ] dx (2.3)
Then a posterior probability q(.), whenever it exists, which minimizes the above quantity
and satisfies the obvious restriction of
fq(x)dx = 1 (2.4)
is the one given by [39-41]
q(x) = p(x)exp {-Z,- k_13k gk(x) } (2.5)
where 13kand _, are the Lagrangian multipliers for equations (2.2) and (2.4).
Remarks:
1) It has been shown [40], that the only operator o that satisfies uniqueness,
invariance, and some other axioms of consistent inference and is implemented
by means of functional analysis is the one given by the principle of minimum
cross-entropy.
2) The maximum entropy method is a special case of the minimum cross-entropy
method where there is no prior information or prior information is uniformly
distributed.
3) Intuitively, the minimum cross-entropy method provides a posterior probability
q(x) that is the closest distribution, in the sense of H[q,p], to the prior
distribution p, yet satisfying the new information provided.
4) Even though H[q,p} is not a metric (does not satisfy the triangle inequality) it is
a good information theoretic measure of closeness.
5) q is closer to the unknown underlying distribution q* than is p.
The main difficulties with the minimum cross-entropy methods are [3]
1) In manycasesasolutionmaynotexist.
2) The requirementthatinformation I bespecifiedasvariousmomentscould be
veryrestrictive.
3)A solution,whenit exists,is usuallyin manysensesnon-robust.
2.3 "Sup" and "inf" approach
Let f_ be the sample space and A the appropriate o-algebra on ft. The most natural way to
incorporate imprecision (i.e., indeterminacies) in probabilities is to define a family of
probability measures P, instead of a single probability measure p, over (f_,A). This
naturally leads to upper and lower probabilities
P*(A) = sup P(A) 'v'Ac A (2.6)
Pc p
and
P.(A) = inf P(A) VAcA (2.7)
Pc p
True probabilities, P(A), are upper and lower bounded as
P,(A) < P(A) < P*(A) ,'v'AcA. (2.8)
Note that, even though every Pc Pis a regular probability measure, P* and P. themselves
need not be additive probabilities. Depending on the structure of P, P* and P.may be
measures that instead of being additive, are super- and sub-additive known as Choquet
capacities ; capacities will be defined rigorously in the sequel.
2.4 Robust methods
The term "robust" was first used by Box in 1953. It usually refers to the situation where
the performance does not degrade much as the parameters (here prior probabilities and
likelihood functions) vary from their nominal values. There are two aspects to robustness;
i.e. robustness analysis (also known as sensitivity analysis) and robustness design. The
terms robust and stable are used sometimes to mean the same thing.
2.4.1Distributionallyrobustapproaches:
Here, first a setof nominal likelihood functions(or models)and a setof nominal prior
probabilitiesis specified.Onecoulddothisevenwhenthesamplesizeis smallandthereis
notmuchconfidencein thesample.Thendefineaneighborhoodfor thenominalmodeland
a neighborhoodfor the nominal priors.Theseneighborhoodsreflect our confidence(or
lack of it) in the nominal values. Finally, design the inferenceor decision-making
procedurewith thefactin mind thattheactualmodelandtheactualpriorscouldvarywithin
theirrespectiveneighborhoods.Onecoulddefinetheseneighborhoodsatleastin twoways:
I) theneighborhoodof agivenmodel,
H) neighborhoodscomposedof amixtureof models.
I) The neighborhood of a given model M 0 :
Let M be the class of all models (e.g., the class of all prior probabilities, or the class of all
likelihood functions). Let M o be the nominal model and M: be a wider class of models
including Mo. This idea is easily depicted in the following figure
Fig. 1
II) The neighborhood composed of a mixture of models:
When it is difficult to justify a single neighborhood of a model, one defines neighborhoods
that are composed of a mixture of models. Graphically this is illustrated in the following
fig. 2
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MFig. 2
Specific examples of these neighborhoods for prior probabilities and likelihood functions
follow.
2.4.2 Example of neighborhoods for prior probability
Let us assume that x, the true prior probability, belongs to class F of the prior probabilities,
where F is defined as follows:
l) l].ll]l.l[_m._].02 [1 l]
F= { o_x: L<x<U} (2.9)
where L and U are lower and upper nonnegative bounding functions and ct is just a
normalizing factor to make x a probability measure.
One way to obtain lower and upper bounds is to estimate the prior probabilities and then
find a confidence interval (limit) for the estimates; thus creating a band for priors.
Remark:
Strictly speaking, prior probabilities should be independent of data and should
be provided without looking at the data.
2) I_- contamination model: [34]
F = { x : x = (l-e) Xo + e xl } (2.10)
where 7t0 is the nominal prior probability, e is the degree of uncertainty in the nominal
priors, 0 < e < 1, and Xl is any unknown and completely arbitrary probability measure.
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Therationalefor thismodel [18] is asfollows. Considera Bayesiandecision-makerwho
afterlooking at theobservationx realizesthathisprior belief7rwasvery far off themark.
Shouldhe stick to it and obtain a posteriordistribution nobody,even he himself will
believein?Or shouldhecheatandchangetheprior?e-contamination allows one to keep an
e of the prior mass in "reserve for emergencies" to cope with situations like above.
3) Prior probabilities specified bv linear inequalities: [31]
In many cases one may only be able to make statements such as: 01 is ten times more likely
than 02, or 01 is less likely to occur than 02 and 03, etc. Such partial prior information could
be specified by set of linear inequalities of the form
17={/1:' ¢x___ O, 1T_ = 1 ,_: > 0 1 (2.11)
2.4.3 Uncertainty models for likelihood functions
In many cases, a precise model for the phenomena under observation may not be available.
For instance, in the early stages of a new disease a precise model may not be available.
Obviously, it would not be very appropriate to use a very precise model since
consequences of error in the assumed model may be very serious both financially and in
terms of human factor. Two extreme case approaches here are either adapting parametric
approaches or distribution-free approaches. Something between these two extreme cases
will be raised, however.
1) Elaborated model: [15]
Let f(xl0) be the nominal model for data x and parameter 0. Then an elaborated model (EM)
can be represented as a family of densities {f(xl0, Z.), Z. e A} with f(xl0) = f(xl0,_.o) for
some Xoe A. Examples of this type of model are:
1.1) The exponential power family
I+X
f(xl la,o,k)o_ o -1 exp -c(X)
(2.12)
11
with _._ (-1,+1). Here X---_-Icorrespondsto a uniform density, _.=0 to the normal
density, and_,=+1 to thedoubleexponentialdensity._.could beconsidered,here,asa
measureof kurtosis.
1.2)TheHuberfamily
where
(2.13)
1 2 IM<_.g(x) = < _lxl _ 1 _.2 lX[ > _.
(2.14)
Notice that as _.---_0, this becomes a double exponential density and as _.---_, it tends to the
normal density. For other values of k, one obtains a normal center and exponential tails.
Notice that to proceed with the above model to the posterior probabilities one would require
the knowledge of the joint prior probabilities, _(0,_.). This point will be returned to latter.
2)llltn.d__iKq.._ [20]
Conceptually, band models for likelihood functions (or conditional densities) are similar to
the band models for prior probabilities. Suppose f0(x) (or f0(xl0)) is the density function,
with respect to some measure I.t (e.g., Lebesgue measure) on the measurable space (X,A),
of a probability measure P0(x) (or P0(xl0)) Consider the neighborhood defined as,
f,f,,fed,:,) (2.15)
where fL, fU are nonnegative bounding functions with fL being bounded. This model may be
useful, for instance, when the density function f estimated from training data are expressed
as lying within pairs of confidence limits.
3) e - contamination model: [22]
.,_ii={fi ] fi--(l-gi)f°+(_i_ '_ Hi I. (2.16)
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This is also similar to the model introduced above for prior probabilities, except here f, fo,
and h are conditional densities. This model was first introduced by Tukey and has the
following intuitive interpretation in statistical classification problems.
The class 0i of observations consists of two classes: the well known frequently observable
class that has the known density fo and the non-studied, rarely observable class with an
unknown density h/; h/; _ H/. If 0i is observed, then an observation from the first part
appears with probability (1- ei) and from the second part with probability ei The e-
contamination model is a special case of the band model where fie = (1-ei)fi and fiu---) oo.
4) Total variational model: [34]
This is another useful neighborhood defined as
p={P" I P(A)-Po(A)I __<_ } , k/A_ A (2.17)
where (fl,A) is the measurable space on which the probability measures are defined. In
terms of densities, it can be written as
j f,x,fo,x,
(2.18)
Once the neighborhoods are defined, then the problem of decision making is to choose an
action, from the set of possible actions (or decisions) that minimizes the maximum risk;
i.e., a minimax approach. Let us use the notation introduced earlier; except to make things
more explicit, the risk function will be written as
r (/c, 8 ) = r (re(0), {f0(x) ], fi(x) ) (2.19)
Then the minimax decision rule 5*, (or actually, F- minimax decision-rule, since the priors
are allowed to vary too) is given by
_i*(x)= arg min ( max r(_(o), {fo},_(x))) (2.20)
8_ D rc_ F
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Theprior probability7rand {fo}0eo for which 8* is attained are called the least favorable
distributions and would be denoted (_L(0), {f0}L). Note that 8" and (_L(0), {f0} L) satisfy
r (_(o), {re}' 8*(x) ) =< r (nL(e), {re} L, _i*(x) ) < r (nL(o), {fo} t', _5(x) ) (2.21)
It is important to note here that, even though it is conceptually simple to model above
minimax approach, obtaining solutions (i.e., _L(0), {f0}L,_ *) may not be so simple.
Solutions for minimax (but not F-minimax) problems have already been found for certain
type of neighborhoods such as e-contamination, band models and total variational
neighborhoods. These neighborhoods all have one thing in common: They all could be
specified as P, where P is a family of distributions defined over measurable space (f_,A)
as
p={Pe M: P(A) < v(A) , VAeA } (2.22)
where Mis the set of all probability measures defined over measurable space (F2,A). P is
said to be the set of probabilities majorized by v.
For an e-contamination neighborhood, v(A) is defined as
v(A) = (l-e) Po(A) + e , A¢: O (2.23)
For a total-variational neighborhood, v(A) is defined as
v(A) = min ( Po(A) + e, 1 ) ,A,O (2.24)
v(A)s defined above have an interesting property; namely, they are set functions that satisfy
the following properties [5]
and
pl) v(o) = O, v(f_) =1
p2) AcB :=_ _A) < _B)
p3) A n 1"A _ v(An) 1" v(A)
p4) F n $ F, F n closed, _ r.,(F n) ,_ v(F)
p5) v(AuB) < v(A)+ v(B)-v(Ac_B).
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Any setfunctionthat satisfiespl)-p4) iscalledaChoquetcapacityor capacity for short. If
it also satisfies p5), then it is called alternating of order 2, or for short, 2-alternating
capacity. A set function u that satisfies pl)-p4), and instead of p5) satisfies
p6) u(AuB) __>u(A) + u(B). u(AnB)
is called a 2-monotone capacity. More generally, consider the successive differences
defined [29] as
VI(B;B1) v = v(B)- v(BuB1) (2.25)
Vn+ 1 (B; B 1...... Bn+l) v = V n (B; B 1...... Bn) v Vn(BUBn+I; B 1...... Bn) v (2.26)
If Vk_<0 for k=l ..... n, then v is called an n-alternating capacity; if Vn<0 for all n, it is
called and infinite alternating capacity. Similarly, let
Al(B; B1) u = u(B)- u(Bc'_B1) (2.27)
An+I(B; B 1...... Bn+l) u = An( B; B1,. .... Bn)u - An(BnBn+l ; B1 ...... Bn)u" (2.28)
If Ak > 0 for k=l ..... n, then u is called an n-monotone capacity; if An > 0 for all n, u is
said to be an infinite monotone capacity. Note that alternating and monotone capacities v
and u, satisfy
v(A) + u(A e) = 1 (2.29)
and are said to be conjugates.
Let us consider the simplest form of decision-making; that is testing a null hypothesis Ho
versus an alternative hypothesis H1. And suppose the prior probability of Ho (and HI) is
t 1),known and is given by _ (and t+l te [0,oo]. Furthermore, suppose the hypotheses
correspond to two imprecisely known likelihood functions; and they can be modeled as sets
majorized by 2-alternating capacities Vo and _. That is,
15
Po = { P'P < v° } (2.30)
and
P1 = { p: p < vl } (2.31)
Recall that this includes such models as the e-contamination and the total-variational model,
etc. Thus one is testing composite hypotheses
"" Po
VS.
H 1 : X N P1 (2.32)
Let A be the critical region of test; i.e. reject Po if x_ A is observed. Then the upper Bayes
risk of the critical region A is (Huber & Strass[17])
t vo(A ) + t (1-Ul(A))
Gt(A) = _ _ (2.33)
To minimize Gt(A), it is enough to minimize the 2-alternating function
Wt(A) = t vo(A) - u_(A). (2.34)
Huber and Starssen [17] state and prove the following lemma
Lemnm 1: For each t_ [0,oo] (i.e., any given priors), there is an At such that,
Wt(A t) = inf Wt(A)
A (2.35)
Note that At minimizes the maximum Bayes risk.
Another approach, other than this minimax approach, could be one based on translating the
imprecision in priors and likelihood functions onto posterior probabilities obtaining a
family of lower and upper posteriors. For the sake of simplicity, let us examine the cases of
imprecision in priors and likelihood functions separately.
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First, let us assume that likelihood functions, p(xlo), are known precisely and the only
source of imprecision is due to priors which can also be modeled by the e-contamination
neighborhood
1-"= { n' n = (l-e) no + e itI } (2.36)
Let n(0ilx) denote posterior probability given by the Bayes rule as
p(xl0 i) n(0 i)
(2.37)X(0il x) = V p(xlo i) /t(0 i)/..._a
0._O
1
and let no(0ilx) denote the posterior probability corresponding to the nominal prior no. Then
Huber [ 18] shows that
no(0il x) + S(0 i)
sup n(oil x)
x_ F 1+ S(0i) (2.38)
and
where
/1;o(0il X)
inf n(0ilx) =
7r_r 1+ s(o_) (2.39)
1 p(xl0i)
S(0i) = I---E" T. p(xl0 i) go(O i)
O.aO
1 (2.40)
NOW suppose that both the likelihood functions and the prior probabilities are given by the
e-contamination models. Following Huber [18], one says upon observing x, the
"information" about e is increased by the (possibly negative) amount
Z x(0il x) log n(oil x) - 2,,t n(0i) log x(0 i)
0._ {9 0.e O
l 1 (2.41)
Then a family {p(. 10i)} of conditional densities and a prior probability 7r will be least
informative if they minimizes
H(p, x) = E x [ { _./l:(0i I x) log X(0i I x ) } - _. n(0i) log n(0i) ] (2.42)
1 1
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I p(xlOi)n(Oi) 1
log
-E 0_. p(x[Oi)_(Oi) _p(x]O i)_( I) -O_ " _(Oi) log_(Oi)
X 1 1 l
subject to the side conditions that
(2.43)
and
Z p(xl oi) = 1
X (2.44)
n(0i) = 1. (2.45)
0.
1
Note that it was assumed that Xis finite. Solution for this problem, except perhaps for very
trivial cases, is difficult to obtain.
2.5 Interval-valued probabilities
Bayesian frame of inference and decision-making requires precise probabilities and has no
provisions for imprecise knowledge. There has been many attempts [2,8,11,24,42,43,
45,46,47] to generalize classical "point-valued" probabilities to "interval-valued"
probabilities. Dempster [8-10], and later Shafer [35-38], in an attempt to generalize the
Bayesian framework, have come up with what is known as the Dempster-Shafer (D-S)
theory of evidence [35]. We will start with an example first, then proceed to point out the
major problems with the D-S theory, and finally describe a more natural extension of usual
probability measures and Bayes theorem cast in this new framework.
2.5.1 Dempster-Shafer theory
The basic idea can become clear with the following (desk) example. Suppose there is a
desk with two drawers on the right side: the right top drawer (RT) and the right bottom
drawer (RB). There are three drawers on the left side: the left top drawer (LT), the left
middle drawer (LM), and the left bottom drawer (LB). Suppose a file is placed, at random,
in one of the drawers. Further suppose that the available information (evidence in the D-S
language) is given as
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Prob( file is in theleft sidedrawers)= m1= 0.5
prob ( " .... " (RT) " ) = m 2 = 0.2
(2.47)
and there is no more information.
Note that the total evidence, ml+ m2 = 0.7 < 1. Shafer calls the difference (1- 0.7 --0.3),
the global ignorance. The global ignorance can be assigned to any of the drawers, and yet
none in particular. Then given the above scenario, one would like to answer questions like
what is the probability that the file is in the CLM) drawer? etc.Obviously, the answer to this
question can not be given by a single number. George Boole [4] was the f'trst to realize this
point and he suggested the idea of inner and outer measures, p. and p*, such that
probability of any event, p, is bounded by p. and p* as
P, <p _<p* . (2.49)
Then how does one compute p. and p*? Shafer calls m's the basic probability assignments
or (bpa)'s. m(A) represents the measure of belief that is committed exactly to set A and not
to any of its proper subsets. Moreover, let us denote the sample space by _, and assume it
is finite. Let 2 fi represent the power set of f/. Then
DEFINITION 2.1: (Shafer [35])
A function m: 211---_ [0,1] is called a basic probability assignment (bpa) whenever
and
Note that
(1) m(_) = 0 (2.50)
(2) _ m(A) = 1.
Ac_ (2.51)
i) It is not required that m(f_) = 1;
ii) It is not required that m(A) < m(B) when A _ B ;
iii) There is no obvious relationship between m(A) and m(AC).
Recall that m(A) reflects the measure of belief that is committed exactly to A, not the total
belief that is committed to A. To obtain the total belief committed to A, Shafer argues, that
one must add to m(A), the bpa of all the proper subsets B of A. He calls this "BELIEF" or
Bel for short. That is
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Bel(A) = 2.1 re(B).
ar,.A (2.52)
Dempster in his original work called these Bers, lower probabilities. More formally, a
function Bel: 2t'l---_[0,1] is called a belief function over f_ if it is given by (2.52), for some
bpa m: 2t'L-_[0,1]. For our earlier "desk" example :
It is important to note that
Bel (file is in (ML) drawer) = 0.
Bel(file is in (RT) drawer) = 0.2.
Bel (A) + Bel (A c) < 1. (2.53)
To see the implication of this relationship, suppose there is no evidence at all to support A,
or BeI(A) = 0. Then, (2.53) says that, in D-S theory, it is not automatically implied that
Bel(A c) = 1; i.e., lack of belief in something does not necessitate its compliment.
Furthermore, the bpa that produces a given belief function can be uniquely recovered from
the belief function. This inverse relation is called mobius inverse. For any belief function
Bel, a dual function plausibility (or "Pr' for short) is defined as
P1 (A) = 1- Bel (AC). (2.54)
In terms of bpa, m, plausibility could be written as
P1 (A)-- Z m(B) .
I
Br'xA_ O (2.55)
Dempster called these Prs, upper probabilities. Note
Pl (A) + Pl (A e) > 1
and
P1 (A) > Bel (A).
(2.56)
(2.57)
From our earlier "desk" example:
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PI (file is in (ML) drawer)= 0.3
P1(file is in (RT) drawer)= 0.5.
To maketheideaof "Bel" and"PI" clearer,let usconsiderthefollowing example.Suppose
we aregiven: m(B1) = 0.3, m(B2)= 0.4, m(B3)= 0.1, m(f2) = 0.2, and want to find the
lowerandupperprobability (orBelandP1)of a setA givenin thefollowingdiagram.
Then
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./"" _z
f i( ,.f
i"" \ '_C_3i-- .1
\',,.,.._j
Fig. 3
Bel (A) = Z m(Bi) = re(B2) = .4
Bi_A
PI (A) = E m(Bi) = m(Bl) + m(B2) + m(E_)
B.r-,A_O
I
=.3 +.4 +.2 =.9.
Shafer, further argues that the class of belief functions can be characterized without
reference to basic probability assignments. That is:
THEOREM 2.1: Shafer [35]
A function Bel: 2fa---_[0,1 ] is a belief function if and only if it satisfies the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Bel (0) = 0.
Bel (f2) = 1.
for every positive integer n and every collection A 1, A 2..... , A n of
subsets of
Bel (ALL) .... LgAn) > Z Bel (Ai) - Z Bel (Air_Aj) + .... + (-1)n+lBel (Aln ...,nAn).
i i<j
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Remark: Note that Bel functions are infinite monotone capacities.
Similarly, one can define plausibility functions as
THEOREM 2.2:
A function PI: 2_[0,1] is a plausibility function if and only if it satisfies the
following conditions:
(1) P1 (0) = 0.
(2) P1 (_) = 1
(3) For every positive integer n and every collection A 1,..... A n of
subsets of
Pl (A1F"J .... ¢'_An) _ E Pl (Ai)- E Pl (mik.dmj) + .... + (-l) n+l Pl (mlk..) .... k..)mn ).
i i<j
Remark :
1) Note that P1 functions are infinite alternating capacities.
2) When Bel(AuB) = Bel(A) + Bel(B), A_B = O belief function becomes the
usual classical probability measures. Furthermore, one can show that (Klir
[23]) a belief function, Bel, on a finite power set 2 fi is a probability measure if
and only if its basic probability assignment, m, is given by m({W})=Bel({w})
and m({A}) = 0 for all subsets of fl that are not singletons.
3) A Bel function that satisfies Bel (A) = 0 for every proper subset A of fl is called
a vacuous belief function. In terms of basic probability assignments, this means
re(t) = 1 and re(A) = 0 for every proper subset A of f_. Furthermore
plausibility of every such A is one, That is
Bel (A) = 0 S pr (A) <_ PI (A) =1 V A c _.
Now that we are equipped with the basic notions of D-S theory, let us see how this theory
address two major issues: 1) combination of various sources of information (evidence),
and 2) the rule of conditioning.
2.5.2 Combination of various sources of information
First of all D-S theory requires that sources of evidence be independent (or non-
interacting). Sources of evidence in remote sensing could be for instance, multispectral
data, elevation data, slope data,etc. Or in medical diagnosis, sources could be the opinion
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of severaldoctors(experts)aboutthesamepatient.D-S theoryproceedsto attainthebpa's
from each source and then combines the bpa's with what is known as Dempster's
orthogonal sum. More specifically, let f_ be the sample space and let ml and m2 be two
bpa's obtained from information sources S 1 and $2 respectively. Then the total information
obtained about f2 from the sources S1 and $2 is given by the new bpa m(c), given as
m(c) = (ml _ m2 ) (c) =
Z ml(Ai).m2(B j
A.nB .=e
l j
1 - Z ml(Ai) m2(Bj )
A.c_B.= O
! j
(2.58)
Note that order of combination is not important. That is
ml_ rn 2 = m2_ m 1 (2.59)
i.e., Dempster's orthogonal sum is commutative. Also, if there are three independent
sources specified by their bpa'sml, m2, and m3, they can be combined by the successive
application of above rule. That is
m = (ml_ m2) _ m3 = ml _) (rn2_ m3 ) (2.60)
and the order of aggregation is not important; i.e., _ is an associative operator.
Intuitively, Dempster's orthogonal sum says that, to find the joint bpa for a set c, take all
the sets from source S1, i.e., Ai's, and all the sets from source $2, i.e., Bj's, multiply their
bpa's and add over all such sets. The denominator is a normalizing constant; it is required
since one of the requirements for a valid bpa function is that it must sum to one.
Dempster's orthogonal sum is the heart of D-S theory and also the major source of
controversy and criticism. The following example, originally due to Zadeh [48-50],
highlights this issue. Suppose O={01,02, 03} is the sample space of outcomes, and the
information available from two independent sources lead to two sets of bpa's given below
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m 1
nh
0 t O2 O3
.9 0.1 0
0 0.1 .9
Then upon applying Dempster's rule of combination, one obtains,
Ol 02 03
m = ml_ m 2 0 1 0
That is, even though both sources individually reflect low beliefs on {02}, after
combination, they collectively confirm {02}! This is highly counter-intuitive; and again
results from the normalization needed in the Dempster's rule.
Walley [44], Krantz and Miyamoto [25], and Shafer [36] have tried to apply the D-S theory
to the problem of statistical inference. For the sake of simplicity, suppose that the state of
nature O is finite; i.e., O={01 ..... 0n} and we have k statistically independent
observations, each specified by a standard parametric model {p_i); 0_ O }, for i=l ..... k.
The p0)'s are probability mass functions on a sample space x. Each p(i) describes a
different statistical experiment, but all are governed by the same parameter O. For the
remote sensing problem, p_0""could be the model for multispectral scanner (MSS) data, and
(2) could be the model for the elevation data, etc. Each observation x(i), i= 1,...,k givesP0
rise ton belief function, Bel_i)(0), i=l ..... k, over O. Bel0_i)(0), i=l ..... k are constructed
depending only on the observation x(i) and the model values pol(x(i)) ..... P0n(x(i)) Prior
information also gives rise to a belief function, Belo(0), over O Then the overall belief
function is constructed as
Bel (0)= Bel o (0)_ Bel (_(_)(0)_ Bel (x_)2)(0) _ .... _ Bel x(k'(k'(0) ,0_®. (2.61)
The main conclusions are (Krantz and Miyamoto [25] and Walley [44]) that Dempster's
rule is not generally suitable for combining evidence from independent statistical
observations (or otherwise, statistically related observations) nor is it suitable for
combining prior belief with observational evidence. Stated differently, if the Bel function is
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interpretedaslower bettingrates,then the useof Dempster'srule to combineprior and
likelihood functions can lead to a sure loss or " Dutch book". That is, Bel cannot
coherently be interpreted as lower betting rates when Dempster's rule is used to combine
priors and likelihood functions.
Finally, it is also interesting to note (Shafer [36]) that in the Bayesian frame of inference,
for a given prior probability distribution r_o over O and a given statistical model {P0; 0e 19}
over X, one can construct a unique distribution p over OxX, unique in the sense that p is
the only distribution that has _o as its marginal for 0 and Pa as its conditional given 0. In the
D-S theory, there may be many belief functions over OxX having a given marginal Belo
and given the conditional P0.
2.5.3 Conditioning rules
An important issue in decision-making and inference is how to change our belief
concerning a particular event in light of new evidence. Of course, when the available
information is in the form of classical point-valued probabilities Bayes rule provides a
natural and sound way of accomplishing this task. In the following section other
possibilities are examined.
2.5.3.a Conditional Bel and P1
Suppose the available information can be represented by a Shaferian belief function, Bel,
and plausibility function, PI, on the frame of discernment O. Suppose, further, that
somehow one learns that O is restricted to B, B c O. Then Shafer [35] suggests the
following:
1) Represent this new information as a new belief function
1 ifBcABel (A) = 0 otherwise.
(2.62)
2) Combine this belief function with the belief function available prior to the new
information by the Dempster's rule of combination to get
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Since
Oneobtains,
Bel ( A IB) = Bel (AwBe) - Bel (B e)
1- Bel (B e)
Pl (A) = I-Bel (Ac)
P1 (Ac_B)
PI(AIB)= PI(B)
(2.63)
(2.64)
(2.65)
2.5.3.b Conditional "sup" and "inf"
Referring to section 2.3, suppose imprecision about the available information is represented
by a family of additive probability distributions P; and
P*(A)= sup P(A)
Pe P (2.66)
and
P,(A)= inf P(A)
Pe P (2.67)
Suppose the new information implies that O is restricted to B, B c @. Then one natural
way of revising our earlier beliefs (probabilities) is to say
P*(AI B) = Sup
Pe P
P(A n B)
P(B)
(2.68)
and
P,(AI B) = inf
Pe P
P(A n B)
P(B)
(2.69)
The following theorem is due to Huber [18] (also see Kyburg [26])
THEOREM 2.3: (REPRESENTATION THEOREM)
Given a belief function, there exists a closed convex set of classical probability
function Pc defined over atoms of O such that for every subset A of O
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Bel (A) - inf P(A) (2.70)
V Pc
And conversely,ifPc isa closedconvex setofclassicalprobabilityfunctiondefinedover
atoms of O, and forevery At, A2 ....., A n C O,
n
inf P( A1uA 2 u ...u A n) > Z inf P(Ai) - Z inf P(AinAj) + ....
i=l l<.l
+ (-l)n inf P(AIc_A2n ..... n A n).
Then there exists a belief function, Bel, such that
(2.71)
BeI(A)= inf
P Pc
P(A)
Using the above representation theorems, it can be easily shown that
inf P(AIB) < Bel(AIB) < PI(AIB) < sup P(AIB)
(2.72)
(2.73)
That is, Shafer's rule of conditioning provides a tighter bound on the conditional values.
It is also interesting to note that Bel (A I B) and PI (A I B) obtained from Shafer's rule of
conditioning are still *o-monotone and **-alternating capacities. Shafer's results are
questionable, however, since they are directly based on Dempster's rule of combination.
Diaconis and Zabell [12,13] recommend the following rule"
and
P,(A I B) -
P,(A n B)
P,(B)
P*(A I B) = 1 - P,(A I B).
(2.75)
(2.76)
Again, P,(. IB) and P*(. IB) would still be *o-monotone and *o-alternating capacities.
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2.5.4.c. Proposed conditioning role
Both Dempster's rule of conditioning (eq.2.65) and Diaconis and Zabelrs rule (eq.2.75)
are counter-intuitive. For instance, let us consider Dempster's rule. Applying the
representation theorem (Theorem 3.2) to the left hand side of the equation one can write
P,(A I B) = infP(A IB) = inf
P P
P(A n B)
P(B)
Applying Theorem 3.2 to the right hand side of eq. 2.75 one obtains
(2.77)
But obviously, in general,
P,(A n B) inf P(A n B)
P,(B) inf P(B)
P
inf P(AnB) _ inf P(AnB)
p P(B) inf P(B)
P
Considering this discrepancy, the following conditioning rule is suggested.
(2.78)
(2.79)
and
P,( A IB) -
P,(A n B)
P*(B)
P*( A I B) = 1 - P,(A c I B)
(2.80)
(2.81)
Notice that our definition (eq. 2.80) differs from, for instance, eq. 2.75 in that lower
conditional probabilities are computed as ratio of lower joint probabilities and upper
marginals; that is, the normalizing factor in the denominator is P*(B) instead of P,(B).
It may be shown (proof omitted here) that P,(AIB) and P*(AIB) obtained above by our rule
of conditioning are also *,,-monotone and _-altemating capacities, respectively.
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2.6 Problems to be solved
It is important to realize that the representation theorem, Theorem 3.2, states only the
existence of a family of probability distributions P. It does not, however, suggest a
method of constructing P, nor does it imply the uniqueness of P..
Our attempt here is in two directions" 1) Try to remedy the problems, mentioned earlier,
with the Dempster's rule; that is, the main effort here is to construct a Bayes-like rule for
capacities. Suggestions for a new rule were made above. Properties of this new rule need
further investigation. 2) Try to come up with computationally simple methods of
consU'ucting P so that the powerful tools of Bayesian methods could be applied, even with
the imprecise probabilities.
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SET-VALUED MEASURES
3.1 Introduction
One of the major criticisms to the Bayesian approach for inference and decision-making is
its requirement of precise probability values. It has been argued by many people that prior
probabilities are subjective and thus it would be unrealistic to assign crisp and precise
values.
Two possible solutions to this problem were distributionally robust approach and the
Dempster-Shafer theory. Even though, robust approaches are conceptually easy and
appealing, obtaining closed form solutions is usually very difficult, except perhaps for
certain type of neighborhoods. Also, the solution is really a" worst-case" type solution.
The belief (and plausibility) functions of the D-S theory being monotone (and alternating)
capacities of infinite order, are generalization of "classical" measure; but the theory is
mainly constructed around Dempster's rule of combination. In our opinion any theory of
statistical inference which is based on Dempster's rule of combination would have serious
problems and should be abandoned.
A more natural solution would be to generalize classical measure theory, so that measures
instead of taking values in Ror R_a, take values in subsets of Ror _, i.e., P (_or P(Rn).
3.2 Set-valued measures
A set-valued measure was introduced by Artstein [1].(Actually, earlier related work was
done by Debru and Schmeidler [6]). A set-valued measure (SVM) is a o-additive set-
function which takes on values in the nonempty subsets of a Euclidean space. Let (fl,A) be
a measurable space, and K(R n) be the nonempty compact subsets of R n Then a SVM is
defined as,
DEFINITION : A set-valued measure is a set function,
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(3.1)
with the following properties:
(1) _t(_) = 0
(2) _t( uj_**_Aj ) = Z _(ij), for every disjoint family {A}j , A._A.j
j=l
where the summation above, is a series of compact subsets of R n. The sum Z I_(Aj) of
j=l
the subsets i.t(Aj), consists of all the vectors a=j=Zla j where the series is absolutely
convergent, and aj_ _t(Aj) for j=l,2 ....
The interval-valued probability measure 0VPM) (I) (see Negoiwta and Ralescu [28]) is a
special type of SVM defined as
and satisfying the properties
(1)
(I). A--) K ( [0,1] )
1_ _(f2) ;
(:) )-- ¢ %)
j=l
(3.2)
where uAj is disjoint collection of events in A and the summation is as defined earlier.
Example 1: Suppose 12 = {0)1, 0)2, 0)3} and the (objectively, or subjectively) following
values are obtained for
(I)({0)1}) = [0.6, 0.7]
_,({_}) = [o.1, o. 15]
Then one necessarily gets (I)({0)3}) = [a,0.15], where a < .15. Note that,
3
(_ (_'2) = (l) (0)lk.) 0)2 k.) 0)3 ) = Z (I) ( 0)i )
= [ .7+a, 1 ]
and for a =.15, (1)(f_) = [0.85,1].
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Remark : Note thatO(f2) = [0.85,1] _ { 1 }(or[I,1]). This is also counter-intuitive; we
will return to this point shortly.
Negoiwta and Ralescu [28] have shown the following results.
Result 1 : The conditionalprobability, given Me A of an event Ae A is given by
O(AIM)- 1 O(AnM).
sup • (M) (3.3)
Result 2: O(MIA) and O(AIM) are related by,
O(MiA)_sup O(M) O(AIM)
sup • (A) (3.4)
and most importantly, the Bayes formula for the interval-valued probability measures
(IVPM) is given by
THEOREM :
Let A1,A2 ..... An form a partition of the sample space f2, and let Be A be an event.
Then
sup • ( A i )
O(AiIB)= n O(BIAi) , i=1,2,. .... n. (3.5)
sup • (Aj) sup • ( B IAj )
j=l
Returning to the problem of statistical inference and decision-making, let Xbe the sample
space of outcomes (or data), and O be a finite parameter space, i.e. O={01 ..... On}. Let 7to
be an interval-valued prior probability measure on O and {O0(x); 0e O} be a family of
conditional interval-valued probability measures on Z Then the Bayes theorem above can
be restated as
sup _ro(0j)
(0il x ) - n t_(x I 0i) . (3.6)
sup rro(0j) sup • (x I 0j )
j=l
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Then upon observing x, the inference or decision-making could be based on the interval-
valued posterior probability measure x(0ilx).
Example 2 :
0_ O} are as
Suppose X = { x r x 2 }, and O = { o1, 02 } and the values of _ and {Oo,
Xo( 01 ) = [ .5, .6 ]
Xo(O 2) = [ .2, .4 ]
and
Then,
and
fO(xllo2)=[.8, .9]
L• ( x21 02) = [ 0 ,.1 ]
.6 [.1 ,.3]
x( oll x1) - (.6)(.3) + (.4)(.9)
= [.11, .33 ]
.6 [ .6, .7 ]
x( °11x2) = (.6)(.7) + (.4)(.1)
= [.78, .92 ]
.4 [.8, .9 ]
x( °21Xl) = (.6)(.3) + (.4)(.9)
= [.59, .67 ]
.4 [ O, .1 ]/t( o21x2) = (.6)(.7) + (.4)(.1)
= [ o, .08 ].
The following definitions and theorem are due to Artstein [1] and Purl and Ralescu [32]
and will be used in the sequel.
DEFINITION:
An atom of the interval-valued probability measure x is an event Ae A with x(A) ;_
{0} and such that A1c A implies x(A1) = {0} or x{AX,A1) = {0}. An interval-
valued probability with no atoms is called nonatomic.
DEFINITION:
A selection p of an interval-valued probability measure x is a vector-valued measure
/9: A-->_, such that p(A)_ x(A) for every Ae .,q.
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THEOREM:
(i) If _ is a bounded, nonatomic set-valued measure, then _x(A) is convex for every
ACA.
(ii) If _ is a bounded set-valued measure, then for every A_ A and sE x(A), there
exists a selection p of x such that p (A) = s.
Note that clearly interval-valued probability measures are bounded.
Remark: For nonatomic interval-valued probability measures, let us denote pl(A)=inf
x(A) and p2(A)=sup x(A).
COLLORARY:
For a nonatomic interval-valued probability measure, P2 is a regular probability
measure.
proof: This follows from the convexity of _ and the requirement of 1 _ x(f2).
A point mentioned earlier and delayed for here is that the above definition of interval-valued
probability measure requires 1_ x(f2), instead of x(f2) = {1}; n(f_)=[a,1] where a < 1.
This seems counter-intuitive because one expects that f2 should happen almost surely.
There are perhaps two ways this point may be addressed:
1) Allow the possibility of n(f2)=[a,1] a < 1, and interpret the quantity (l-a) as the
"degree of uncertainty" about the space of outcomes, _.
2) Add the extra requirement that x(f2)=l. But from this requirement, plus the
requirement of additivity, under Minkowski set additions, it immediately
follows that one may come up with the interval-valued probability of an event
A, such that, x(A)=[p,q] and p > q ; i.e., the set of values x takes on may be
possibly not an ordered set.
If one should insist that x take on values from an ordered set, plus the requirement
x(f_)={ 1 } and the additivity property, then one should replace Minkowski addition with a
different type of set addition operation.
Since the main subjects under consideration are inference and decision-making, these
issues are addressed next.
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INFERENCE AND DECISION-MAKING WITH IMPRECISE
POSTERIOR PROBABILITIES
4.1 Introduction
Regardless of the method used to model imprecise prior probabilities and the conditional
probabilities, and how they are combined to obtain posterior probabilities, the next issue is
how does one proceed with these imprecise posteriors to make inferences and decisions.
In statistical inference the goal is not to make an immediate decision, but instead to provide
a "summary" of the statistical evidence which a wide variety of future "users" of this
evidence can easily incorporate into their own decision-making process. Posterior
probabilities carry the required information. So as far as the statistical inference is
concerned, once the posterior probabilities are obtained the task is completed.
In a decision-making process, however, given an observation, prior information and the
models (or conditional densities), rationality dictates that an action a i, from the set of
possible actions, should be chosen that has minimum expected loss (risk).
To be more specific, let us assume a countable parameter set O, an action set a={al,
a2 ..... am }, an observation set Xp and a loss function
L: a x O ---_ _( (4.1)
such that L(ai,0j) is the loss incurred when action a i is selected and the state of nature
(parameter) is aj ; and the set D = {_il,52 .... } of nonrandomized decision functions
8 : X-._ a. (4.2)
Note that in many applications (e.g., estimation problems) a = O. Furthermore, let us
represent the "posterior" upper and lower "probabilities" obtained from combination of
imprecise priors and imprecise model by { P*x(0i) and P*x(0i); 0i_ O, xE X}. We put
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"posterior" and "probabilities" in quotation marks, becausetheseupper and lower
quantitiesmay not be posteriorsin the Bayesiansense,and most likely would not be
probabilitiesin theclassicalprobabilitysense;at best,theymaybe**-alternatingand**-
monotonecapacities.Thequestionis:
Given { P*x(0i) andP*x(0i); 0i_O, x_ X} how does one compute expected losses?
4.2 How should upper and lower expectations be defined?
Without loss of generality, assume the loss function is a positive function. Then a natural
way to define upper and lower expected loss is to define them (analogous to classical
probability) as
E* L(ai,o) = '_ k. P* { e': L(ai,o') = k } (4.3)
{ k :(30) & k= L(ai,e) I
and
E, L(ai,o) = _ k.P. { e'- L(ai,o') = k } (4.4)
X
{k :(30) & k= L(ai,0) I
Note that E* [ and E, ] would be 2 (or higher order) altemating [and monotone] capacities if
P* [and P.] are 2 (or higher order) capacities.
Wolfeson and Fine [47], following Dempster, define the upper and lower expectation as
and
E* L(ai,e ) a= L (ai) = k. [ P.x({ o': L(ai,o' ) <_k })-
{k :(30) & k=L(ai,O) }
P, (1 e': L(ai,e') < k 1) ]
X
(4.5)
E. L(ai,e) a__ L (a i) = k.[ Px({O':L(arO')_<kl)-
{k :(3O) & k= L(ai,e) }
P_ ({ o': L(arO') < k }) ]
(4.6)
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WhenP* [and P,] are 2-alternating [ and monotone] capacities, E* [ and E, ] have, among
others, the following properties:
1) (V Z) E*Z>E,Z
2) E* (-Z) = - E, (-Z) ; i.e E ° and E, are conjugates.
Also if one obtains P* and P, from
P*(A) = sup P(A)
P_ p
'v'Ac A (4.7)
then
P.(A)= inf P(A)
Pc p
VAc A (4.8)
E*(Z) = sup Ep(Z)
Pc P
(4.9)
E,(Z) = inf Ep(Z) (4.10)
Pc P
Note that the above upper probabilities are used to compute the lower expectations and
vice-versa. Note also that upper and lower expectations given by
E* L(arO) = __E k. P,x ( {o': L(ai,o') = k } )
{k :(30) & k= L(ai,O) ]
(4.11)
E, L(ai,o)= E k P* ( {o': L(ai,o')= k } )
{k :(30) & k= L(ai,0) }
are different than the ones given in (4.3) and (4.4). Furthermore, since in general
(4.12)
P*( {o: L(arO) = k 1)¢: [P*( {o: L(ai,o) < k })- P*( {o: L(arO) <k}) ] (4.13)
P,( {o: L(ai,o) = k })g[ P,( {0: L(ai,o) < k })- P,( {o: L(arO) <k}) ] (4.14)
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using the right hand side of (4.13) and (4.14) in (4.3) and (4.4) would result in yet
different values. Which one of the upper and lower pair of values is correct ? One may have
to experimentally justify one pair over the other. Thus given an observation, regardless of
which method is used to get the expected values, one obtain a pair of upper and lower
expected losses. Then decisions are based on the values of these pairs.
With the usual point-value probabilities, expected losses are also point-valued; and we
choose an action that has minimum expected loss (risk). For upper and lower expected
losses, however, the problem is a little more complicated.
When the upper and lower expected loss (U&L EL) intervals are non-intersecting, the
choice of an action is easy. That is, we order acts by dominance: a: > a2 (read a I is
preferred to a2) if and only if
L (a 1) > L (a2) (4.1.5)
And for more than two actions, we choose action ai* such that
a*, = arg ( max L (aft) (4.16)
J
When the (U&L EL) intervals overlap, however, we face the problem of indecisiveness.
When L (aft > L (a i) but L (aft < L (ai) (i.e., [ L (aft, L, (aft ] c [ L, (ai), L (ai) ]), that is
intervals are nested, and it is not clear which action should be preferred and why.
What can be done, however, is to eliminate from the set of possible actions, those that are
not preferable. That is, suppose for ak, k#i, k#j, k=l,2 ..... m,
L (ak) < L, (a i)
and
L (al,) < L (aj).
Then eliminate ak, k#i, k#j, k=l,2 ..... m from further considerations. And try to resolve
the remaining indecision between ai and aj. Note also that one may face indecisiveness
between a i and aj when,
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and
L(aj) > L(a i)
L (aj)
There are two possibilities at this point:
> L (ai)
1) Claim indecisiveness and require more
information (e.g., in the form of more sample data for the frequentist approach), 2) Use
some ad hoc but "reasonable" approach to resolve the problem. Let us show the above
situation graphically (see fig. 4.1).
I:(aj)
I:(.,)IT L(.,) [.(.0 i I [(.j)
L-(ai) L(ai) L(_j)
(a) (b)
u
L(aj) I
E(a,) ] __.(_j) [(_,)
L(ai ) __.(ai ) I n_(aj)
(c) (d)
Fig. 4.1 - Four possibilities for actions a i and aj with overlapping expected
utilities : a) _aj)much larger than I_ai) but L(aj) slightly larger
than L(ai). b), c), d) etc.
In fig. 4.1 above the following is recommended:
For a) aj > ai That is aj is preferred over a i.
For b) aj and aj are about equally preferable; this situation can happen in point-
valued expected loss problems too when the expected loss of two actions are
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equal.We saythatweareindifferent about aj and aj ; and use a "tie-breaking"
rule to decide.
For c) aj > ai.
For d) Again aj > ai.
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5.1 Summary
This work examined the following three issues. First, how best to describe the imprecise
knowledge about prior probabilities and conditional densities. Second, how best to
combine these imprecise values to get the so called posterior probabilities. And finally how
to make decisions with imprecise posteriors.
Various methods in the literature such as distributionally robust approaches, Dempster-
Shafer theory and set-valued measures were examined. It was noted that even though
distributionally robust approaches offer intuitively simple ways of expressing imprecision
in the available knowledge, in general obtaining closed form solutions for the minimax
decision rules except for some special families of distributions, namely classes of
distributions majorized with Choquet capacities, are very difficult. Also robust methods
really treat only the problem of designing against the worst case situations.
In examining the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory, it was noted that even though D-S theory
provides a reasonable method for modeling imprecision, there are at least two major
problems with the theory: 1) The theory is mainly built around the Dempster's rule of
combination of evidences; this rule, however, has been under major criticisms. Recalling
that Dempster-Shafer's upper and lower probabilities (or in D-S language, the plausibility
and belief) are *o- alternating and **-monotone capacities, respectively, then the main thrust
here should be an attempt to find a Bayes-like rule for capacities. 2) The computational
complexity of the Dempster's rule is shown to be #P-complete [30]. That is, even given as
input a set of tables representing basic probability assignments ml, m2 ..... rn, over a
frame of discernment O, and a set A _ O, the problem of computing the basic probability
value (ml_ m 2 • ... • m n )(A) is #P-complete.
Interval-valued probabilities (or set-valued measures in general) start from the very
beginning by assigning intervals (or sets) to each event. That is, if one is not able to assign
single values to the probabilities of events, one will assign intervals (or sets) of values for
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theprobabilities.Thereal-valuednessaxiomof conventional probability theory is relaxed.
Then, in an attempt to preserve the (countable) additivity axiom, the additivity is defined in
terms of set additions. The main problem here, at least with the current definition of set
additions, is that one cannot simultaneously enforce the requirements that: 1) measure of
null even has to be zero; 2) keep the additivity axiom; and 3) have the measure of the sure
event equal to one. Therefore, the third requirement is relaxed. This is, however, quite
counter-intuitive since then one could define a new event and assign the remaining
probability mass to this event.
Finally, we looked at the issue of decision making with imprecise posterior probabilities.
This rises from the fact that if one starts with imprecise models and/or imprecise priors one
is bound to arrive at imprecise posteriors. The specific form of the set of the posteriors at
this point is irrelevant. Even though some specific situations were considered, the problem
basically still remains as an open problem. This is because the conventional decision theory
(based on the utility theory) assumes point-valued probabilities. Preferences on the set of
actions or decisions are ordered using their expected utilities. It is this ordering property
that is lost when we consider sets of imprecise probabilities.
42
References
[1]
[2]
[31
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
Z. Artstein, " Set-valued measures," Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 165, 103-125
(1972).
R.J. Beran, " Upper and lower risks and minimax procedures," In Proc. Sixth
Berkeley Syrup. Math. Statist. Probab., Univ. of California Press.
J.O. Berger, " Statistical decision theory and Bayesian analysis," Springer-
Verlag, Second edition (1985).
G. Boole, " An investigation of the laws of thought," (1854); Reprinted by
Dover (1958).
G. Choquet, " Theory of capacities," Ann. Inst. Fourier 5, 131-295 (1953).
G. Debreu and D. Schmeidler, " The Raydon-Nikodym derivatives of a
correspondence," Proc. Sixth Berkeley Symp. Math. Statist. Probab., 41-56.
Univ. of California Press.
B. De Finetti," Probability, induction and statistics," Wiley (1972).
A. Dempster, " A generalization of Bayesian inference (with discussion)," J.
Royal Statist. Soc. B 30, 205-245 (1968).
A. Dempster, " New methods for reasoning towards posterior distributions
based on sample data," Ann. Math. Statist. 37, 355-374 (1966).
A. Dempster, " Upper and lower probabilities induced by a multivalued
mapping," Ann. of Math. Statist., 38, 325-329 (1967).
L. DeRobertis and J. A. Hartigan, "Bayesian inference using intervals of
measures," Ann. Statist. vol. 9, No. 2, 235-244 (1981).
P. Diaconis and S. Zabell," Updating subjective probabilities," J. Statist.
Assoc. 77, 822-830 (1980).
P. Diaconis and S, Zabell," Some Alternatives to Bayes' rule," TR. No. 339
Stanford University (1983).
P.C. Fishburn, " Analysis of decisions with incomplete knowledge of
probabilities," Op. Res. 13 217-237 (1965).
J.P. Florens et. al. (eds.), " Specifying statistical models," Lecture Notes in
Statistics # 16, Springer-Veflag (1981).
D.C. Heath and W.D. Sudderth, " On finitely additive priors, coherence, and
extended admissibility," Ann. Statist. 43 2072-2077 (1978).
P. Huber and V. Strassen, " Minimax tests and the Neyman-Pearson lemma for
capacities," Ann. Statist., 1,251-263 (1973).
43
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
P. Huber, " The use of Choquet capacities in statistics," Bull. of the lnternat.
Statist. Inst. Vol. XLV, Book 4, 181-188 (1973).
E.T. Jaynes, " Prior probabilities," IEEE Trans. Syst. Sci. Cybern., vol. SSC-
4, 227-241 (1968).
S.A. Kassam, " Robust hypothesis testing for bounded classes of probability
densities," IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, Vol. IT-27, No. 2, 242-247 (1981).
J.B. Kadane and D.T. Chung, "Stable decision problems," Ann. Statist. 6
1059-1110 (1978).
Y.S. Kharin, " Stability of decision rules in pattern recognition problems,"
Automatika and Remote Control, II 115-123 (1982).
G.J. Klir and T.A. Folger, "Fuzzy sets, uncertainty, and information,"
Prentice-Hall (1988).
[24] B.O. Koopman, "The axioms and algebra of intuitive probability'" Ann. Math.
41 269-278 (1940).
[25] D.H. Krantz and J. Miyamoto, " Priors and likelihood ratios as evidence," J.
Amer. Statist. Assoc. 78, 418-423 (1983).
[26] H.E. Kyburg Jr., " Bayesian and non-Bayesian evidential updating," Artificial
Intelligence 271-293 (1987).
[27] D.A. Lane and W. D. Sudderth, " Coherence and continuous inference," Ann.
Statist. Vol. 11, No. 1,114-120 (1983).
[28] C.V. Negoiwta and D. Ralescu," Simulation, knowledge-based computing, and
fuzzy statistics," Van Nostrand Reinhold (1987).
[29] H.T. Nguyen, " On random sets and belief functions," Ann. Math. Anal. Appl.
65, 531-542 (1978).
[30] P. Orponen," Dempster's rule of combination is #p-complete," Artificial
Intelligence 245-253 (1990).
[31] J.M. Potter and B.D. Anderson, " Partial prior information and
decisionmaking, " IEEE trans. Syst. Man Cybern., Vol. SMC-10, No.3, 125-
133 (1980).
[32] M.L. Puri and Dan A. Ralescu, " Strong law of large numbers with respect to a
set-valued probability measure," Ann. Prob., Vol. 11, No.4, 1051-1054
(1983).
[33] E. Regazzini, " De Finetti's coherence and statistical inference," Ann. Statist.
15 no. 2 845-864 (1978).
[34] W.J. Rey," Robust statistical methods," Lecture notes in math. 690 (1980).
[35] G. Shafer," A mathematical theory of evidence," Princeton Univ. Press (1976).
44
[36] G. Sharer,"Belief functionsandparametricmodels(with discussion),"J. Roy.
Statist. Soc. Ser. B 44, 322-352 (1982).
[37] G. Shafer," Allocation of probability : A theory of partial belief," Princeton
doctoral dissertation (1973).
[38] G. Shafer, "A theory of statistical evidence (with discussion)," In Foundation
of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science
(w.L. Harper and C.A. Hooker, eds.) 2, 365-436 Riedel, Dordrecht.
[39] J.E. Shore and R.W. Johnson, " Axiomatic derivation of the principle of
maximum entropy and the principle of minimum cross-entropy," IEEE Trans.
Inform. Theory, Vol. IT-26, 26-37 (1980).
[40] J.E. Shore and R.W. Johnson, " Properties of cross-entropy minimization,"
IEEE Trans. Inform Theory, vol. IT-27,472-482 (1981).
[41] J.E. Shore and R.M. Gray, "Minimum cross-entropy pattern classification and
cluster analysis," IEEE Trans. Patt. Anal. and Mach. lntell., vol. PAMI-4,
No.I, 11-17 (1981).
[42] C.A.B. Smith, " Consistency in statistical inference and decision (with
discussion)," J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. B, 23, 1-25 (1961).
[43] P. Suppes and M. Zanotti, " On using random relations to generate upper and
lower probabilities, "Synthese 36 427-440 (1977).
[44] P. Walley, " Belief function representations of statistical evidence," Ann.
Statist. Vol. 15, No. 4, 1439-1465 (1987).
[45] P. Walley and T.L. Fine, " Toward a frequentist theory of upper and lower
probability," Ann. Statist. 10 no.3 741-761 (1983).
[46] P.M. Williams, " Indeterminate probabilities," In Formal methods in the
methodology of empirical sciences, M. Przelecki, K. Szaniawski, and R.
Wojeiki (eds.) Reidel (1976).
[47] M. Wolfenson and T.L. Fine, " Bayes-like decision making with upper and
lower probabilities," J. Amer. Statsit. Assoc. 77, 80-88 (1982).
[48] L.A. Zadeh," On the validity of Dempster's rule of combination," memorandum
No. UCB/ERL M79/24, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley (I979).
[49] L.A Zadeh," Review of : 'A mathematical theory of evidence' by G. Shafer,"
Artificial Intelligence, 81-83 (1984).
[50] L.A. Zadeh," A simple view of The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence and its
implication for the rule of combination," Artificial Intelligence, 85-90 (1986).
45

